The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations by Rosanne Altshuler
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations
Volume Author/Editor: Martin Feldstein, James R. Hines Jr., R. Glenn Hubbard
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-24095-9
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/feld95-2
Conference Date: January 13-15, 1994
Publication Date: January 1995
Chapter Title: Do Repatriation Taxes Matter? Evidence from the Tax Returns
of U.S. Multinationals
Chapter Author: Rosanne Altshuler
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7746
Chapter pages in book: (p. 253 - 276)9  Do Repatriation Taxes Matter? 
Evidence from the Tax Returns 
of U.S. Multinationals 
Rosanne Altshuler, T. Scott Newlon, and 
William C. Randolph 
An open question in the literature on the taxation of multinational corporations 
is  whether  taxes  due  on  repatriation  of  foreign-source  income  influence 
whether the profits of foreign subsidiaries are repatriated or reinvested abroad. 
Theoretical arguments by Hartman (1985) suggest that dividend payments by 
foreign subsidiaries should not be influenced by such repatriation taxes. Under 
this view, which is analogous to the “new view” of dividend taxation applied to 
domestic firms, taxes due upon repatriation are unavoidable costs for “mature” 
foreign subsidiaries that finance investment out of retained earnings.’ As a re- 
sult, investment and dividend payment decisions are unaffected by those taxes. 
The results of  recent empirical work that used cross-sectional data on U.S. 
multinationals seem to contradict Hartman’s theoretical result. These studies 
indicate that dividend remittances are sensitive to repatriation taxes. This pres- 
ents a puzzle. 
Hartman’s analysis (and the new view of dividend taxation) is based on the 
assumption that taxes on dividends are constant over time. This paper investi- 
gates whether the empirical evidence can be reconciled with the theoretical 
results by recognizing that repatriation taxes on dividends may vary over time. 
This variability may  provide firms with an incentive to repatriate relatively 
more profits from a subsidiary when the tax cost of  doing so is temporarily 
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1. See King (1977),Auerbach (1979). and Bradford (1981). 
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relatively lower than normal, and to retain more profits when the tax cost of 
repatriation is higher than  Such timing behavior could be revealed in 
cross-sectional data by a relationship between dividend payout levels and the 
current level of the tax cost of dividend payments, when the actual relationship 
is between dividend payout levels and the current level of the tax cost relative 
to its normal  level. If timing opportunities are important to dividend payout 
decisions, it becomes difficult to interpret the tax effects estimated in previous 
papers. In particular, these estimates will tend to confuse the effects of perma- 
nent tax changes, as would occur due to changes in statutory tax rates, with the 
effects of tax changes due to transitory changes in the situation of the taxpayer. 
It is important to distinguish whether cross-sectional differences between 
subsidiaries in dividend payout behavior are due to the current level of the tax 
cost of paying dividends or to the difference between the current and the nor- 
mal, or expected future, tax cost. Making this distinction will help us evaluate 
the effects of tax policy on the location of investment, the form of finance, and 
tax revenues. More specifically, it has implications for the evaluation of poli- 
cies such as the reduction of withholding tax rates in bilateral tax treaties and 
the repeal of the deferred taxation that foreign profits generally enjoy in the 
United States. The policy implications of this work are discussed in more detail 
in the final section of the paper. 
Microdata can be used to distinguish the effects of transitory variation in tax 
costs from the effects of permanent differences in tax costs. This paper uses a 
recently  created data  set containing U.S.  tax return  information  for a large 
sample of U.S. corporations and their foreign subsidiaries. For some of our 
empirical work, we link the  subsidiary-specific data across time to create a 
panel data set. To our knowledge, this is the largest panel data set in existence 
that contains tax information on multinationals. It is also the only panel data 
set that has detailed tax information on both the parent corporations and their 
foreign subsidiaries. 
We use information about cross-country differences in tax rates to estimate 
separate effects for the permanent and transitory components of the tax price 
of dividend repatriation. The idea is that variations across countries in average 
repatriation tax prices or in statutory tax rates will be correlated with the per- 
manent component of tax price variation, but uncorrelated with transitory vari- 
ations. Using these measures to construct instrumental variables for the tax 
price allows us to separately identify permanent  and transitory tax price ef- 
fects.  Our estimation  strategy  is  similar  to that  of  Burman  and  Randolph 
(1994), who used  state tax rates as instruments to separate permanent from 
transitory effects of taxes on capital gains realizations. 
To preview our results, we find that the permanent tax price effect is signifi- 
2. The term “normal” is used here to imply that there is some permanent, or long-run average, 
repatriation tax cost that the multinational faces. By “normal” tax cost we really mean expected 
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cantly different from the transitory price effect and is not significantly different 
from zero, while the transitory tax price effect is negative and significant. This 
suggests that previous cross-sectional analysis has measured the effect of tim- 
ing behavior, either through tax planning that affects both the tax price and 
dividend payments or through companies timing their repatriations to take ad- 
vantage of exogenous transitory variations in tax prices. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 9.1 briefly re- 
views Hartman’s analysis, the related empirical literature, and some more re- 
cent theoretical work in this area. Section 9.2 derives the tax price of a dividend 
repatriation, section 9.3 presents the empirical model,  and  section 9.4 de- 
scribes the data. Results are presented in section 9.5, followed by  concluding 
remarks. 
9.1  Hartman Analysis and Subsequent Studies 
The U.S. system for taxing the income earned by the foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. corporations defers taxation of foreign income until it is brought back to 
the United States and provides a credit for foreign taxes paid.3  Under this credit 
and deferral system, the two main forms of repatriation tax that a firm  incurs 
on income remitted from a foreign subsidiary are the residual home-country 
tax liability (if  any) not offset by  the foreign tax credit and any withholding 
tax imposed by the source country. Hartman (1985) argued that, under a credit 
and deferral tax system, the repatriation tax on foreign-source income is irrele- 
vant to the investment and dividend payment decisions of foreign subsidiaries 
that are financed through retained earnings (“mature” subsidiaries). Hartman’s 
insight was that, since the repatriation tax is unavoidable, it reduces the oppor- 
tunity cost of investment and the return to investment by the same amount. As 
a result, the tax  does not affect a mature subsidiary’s choice between rein- 
vesting its foreign earnings and repatriating funds to its parent.4 His analysis 
is essentially an application of the “new view” or “tax capitalization view” of 
dividend taxation put forward by King (1977), Auerbach (1979), and Bradford 
(1981). The new  view holds that taxes on dividends (if constant over time) 
have no distortionary effects on the real decisions of domestic corporations. 
Although Hartman’s analysis pertains to the residual U.S. tax on foreign in- 
come, it applies equally well to withholding taxes. 
Several empirical studies using cross sections of tax return data appear to 
contradict Hartman’s theoretical result. Mutti (1981) used U.S. tax return data 
from 1972 to estimate the effect of  tax costs on the choice of  income remit- 
tance channels. He found significant tax effects in estimates of the parameters 
3. The Subpart F provisions of the tax code provide for accrual basis taxation on certain for- 
eign income. 
4.  Note that this result does not imply that home- and host-country taxes have no effect on the 
repatriation decision. They do have an impact due to their effect on home- and host-country after- 
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of a dividend equation. Goodspeed and Frisch (1989) and Hines and Hubbard 
(1990) both used  1984 tax return data of large samples of US. corporations 
and their foreign subsidiaries to investigate tax effects on foreign income re- 
mittances. Goodspeed  and Frisch matched data on parent corporations with 
country-specific  information  on  their  foreign  subsidiaries  in  an  attempt  to 
quantify income repatriation incentives created by the U.S. tax system. By fur- 
ther disaggregating the 1984 tax return data, Hines and Hubbard were able to 
study income repatriation behavior using a data set that matched subsidiary- 
specific information to parent corporation data. Both studies found significant 
evidence of tax effects on income repatriation. Altshuler and Newlon (1993) 
used U.S. tax return data from 1986 to investigate tax effects on dividend re- 
mittances from foreign subsidiaries to their U.S. parent corporations. This pa- 
per improved on previous work by providing a more accurate specification of 
the tax incentives facing firms. Results from estimates of dividend equations 
indicated a somewhat larger and more significant tax effect than had been pre- 
viously estimated. 
Recognizing that Hartman’s theoretical analysis did not allow repatriation 
taxes to vary over time may help to reconcile it with the empirical results from 
the above studies. There are at least two different ways in which the repatriation 
tax may vary. First, it may vary over time due to differences between the tax 
base definitions of the United States and the host country of the foreign subsid- 
iary. The US.  foreign tax credit is based on the average foreign tax rate of the 
subsidiary, where the average is calculated with respect to the U.S. definition 
of  the tax base.  Differences in tax base definitions  may vary over time, for 
example, if capital cost allowances differ, causing the average foreign tax rate 
as defined by the United States to vary. This variation in the average foreign 
tax rate causes the foreign tax credit allowed for a given dividend payment to 
vary over time as well. Such variations in the average foreign tax rate may be 
planned. For example, to the extent that the timing of deductions and credits 
is discretionary, a foreign subsidiary may shift them from years in which it is 
remitting income to years in which it is not remitting income, thereby  max- 
imizing the foreign tax credit. This device is known as the “rhythm method” 
in the tax-planning jarg~n.~ 
The second cause of  variation  in the repatriation tax is movement by  the 
parent company between being in “excess credit,” that is, having more foreign 
tax credits available than are needed to offset potential U.S. tax liability on 
foreign-source income, and being in “excess limitation,” the opposite condi- 
5. The rhythm method was a more useful tax-planning device for US.  multinationals prior to 
the Tax Reform Act of  1986, when the foreign tax credit was calculated year by  year. The 1986 
act switched to a system in which the foreign tax credit is calculated based on the pool of pre- 
viously unremitted foreign earnings and uncredited taxes, and therefore shifting the year in which 
tax credits and deductions are taken has much less effect on the foreign tax rate for U.S.  foreign 
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tion. Since the U.S. foreign tax credit operates, to some extent, on an overall 
basis, excess foreign tax credits generated from one source of foreign income 
can be used to offset potential U.S. tax on another source of foreign income 
that generates insufficient foreign tax credits. If  the parent corporation is in 
excess credit, there is no additional U.S. tax cost to repatriating foreign in- 
come. If  the parent is in excess limitation, the U.S. tax cost of  repatriating 
income from a subsidiary may be positive or negative, depending on the aver- 
age foreign tax rate of the subsidiary. 
Several recent theoretical contributions have incorporated a repatriation tax 
that may  vary over time and that may be endogenous to the investment and 
financial decisions of subsidiaries and parent corporations. Hines (1994) shows 
that U.S. tax payments on foreign-source income are affected by differences 
in the way the United States and host countries determine taxable income. In 
his model, the repatriation tax is a function of the ratio of U.S.-defined income 
to foreign-defined income. He points out that this ratio may vary over time and 
may  be affected by  investment decisions. As a result, investment incentives 
may be influenced by  the repatriation tax. Leechor and Mintz (1993) make a 
similar argument. In their model, the repatriation tax is also endogenous and 
the Hartman result obtains only when host and home country tax bases, ad- 
justed for inflation, are proportional to each other. 
Altshuler and Fulghieri (1994) offer a model in which parent corporations 
may switch into and out of the excess credit position. This model shows that 
the Hartman result obtains only when the credit position is stationary. The in- 
sight here is that switching between credit states breaks down the equivalence 
between the impact of repatriation taxes on the opportunity cost of capital and 
on the returns to investment. 
In  one sense, none of  these recent theoretical contributions has departed 
from the Hartman result: the level of  the repatriation tax does not by  itself 
affect the incentive to repatriate income rather than reinvest it. Instead, it is the 
variation over time in the level of the repatriation tax that affects the incentive 
to repatriate income, because this variation provides parent corporations with 
the opportunity to time remittances so that they occur in years when repatria- 
tion tax rates are relatively low. If these theoretical predictions are correct, then 
failure to distinguish between the effects of permanent and transitory variation 
in the tax price when estimating tax effects on repatriation of foreign income 
could lead to incorrect results. The effect of  permanent variation in the tax 
price might be overstated, since the estimates would confound the effects of 
permanent and transitory variation in the tax price. 
9.2  Tax Price of Dividend Repatriations 
In this section we specify a measure of the tax price of repatriating foreign 
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cause that tax price to vary over time.6 To understand how these tax prices are 
derived, some background information on the foreign tax credit is useful. The 
discussion here borrows heavily from Altshuler and Newlon (1993). 
The foreign  tax  credit  has two  components.  The first, called  the  “direct 
credit,” is a credit for foreign taxes paid directly on income as it is received by 
a U.S. taxpayer. Foreign taxes eligible for the direct credit include withholding 
taxes on remittances to the U.S. taxpayer such as dividends, interest, and royal- 
ties, and also income taxes on foreign branch operations. The second compo- 
nent, called the “deemed-paid” or “indirect credit,” is a credit for foreign in- 
come taxes paid on the income out of  which a dividend distribution is made 
to the U.S. taxpayer. The deemed-paid credit is generally a credit for foreign 
corporate income taxes. 
The deemed-paid credit for a dividend remittance from a foreign subsidiary 
is calculated by grossing up the dividend to reflect the foreign tax deemed paid 
on that dividend income.’ To illustrate, suppose subsidiary i makes a dividend 
payment, D,, to its parent corporation. The grossed-up dividend is 
(1)  D, + TD,/(Y -  TI, 
where T denotes the total foreign income tax paid by  subsidiary i and Y  de- 
notes the subsidiary’s pretax income from the US. perspective, which is the 
subsidiary’s book earnings and profits. Equation (1) can be rewritten as D,/(  1 
-  T,), where T, represents the average subsidiary tax rate, TIT,  on foreign earn- 
ings from the U.S. perspective. The U.S. tax on the dividend before credits is 
TO,/(  1 -  T,), where T denotes the U.S. rate of tax. The United States considers 
that creditable foreign tax was paid on the dividend in the amount of T,D,/(  1 
-  T,). The U.S. tax liability on the dividend payment  after the deemed-paid 
credit is therefore D1(7 -  ~~)/(1  -  T,). 
The amount of foreign tax credit that can actually be used is limited, how- 
ever, to the amount of US.  tax payable on foreign income. Therefore, if the 
foreign tax rate, T~,  exceeds the U.S. tax rate, T, excess credits are created in 
the amount of D,(T, -  ~)/(1  -  7,).  If the foreign tax rate is less than the U.S. 
tax rate, then a U.S. tax liability of D,(T -  TJ/(  1 -  7J  accrues, and the remitted 
foreign income is said to be creating excess limitation. 
As noted above, the limitation on the foreign tax credit operates to some 
extent on an overall basis. This means that excess credits accruing from one 
source of foreign income can often be used to offset U.S. tax (excess limita- 
6.  Although we focus on dividend payments, income may be remitted to parent companies in 
the form of interest, rents, and royalty payments. Previous work by Altshuler and Newlon (1993) 
suggests that dividend payments are the most important channel for income remittances, making 
up over 60 percent of the total foreign income derived by U.S. parents from their foreign subsidiar- 
ies in 1986. 
7. As mentioned above, for tax years beginning in 1987, the amount of foreign tax credit associ- 
ated with a dividend payment is based on the accumulated value of earnings and profits. Although 
this changes the gross-up formula in the text, it is not relevant for our analysis since our data are 
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tion) on foreign income from another source. This is called cross-crediting or 
averaging of foreign income. The ability to cross-credit means that the effect 
of repatriating foreign income from a particular source may be positive, nega- 
tive, or zero.8 
9.2.1  Derivation of Tax Prices 
We define the tax price of a dividend remittance as the additional global tax 
liability arising from an incremental dollar’s worth of  dividend repatriations. 
To  derive the tax price we must take into account both the incremental U.S. 
and source country taxes on a dollar of dividends. The U.S. tax liability gener- 
ated by  dividend payments before the foreign tax credit equals TD,/(~  -  T). 
The foreign taxes creditable against U.S. tax liability are deemed-paid taxes 
plus withholding taxes, or 
(2)  7,Dg/(1  -  7,) + w,D,, 
where w, denotes the withholding tax rate in the host country. If the parent is 
in excess credit, any U.S. tax liability on a dollar of dividends is offset by the 
foreign tax credit. If  the parent is in excess limitation, the US.  tax liability 
equals 
(3)  (T -  7JDi/(l  -  T~)  -  w,DI. 
To compute the global tax price of a dollar of dividends we add the source- 
country effect to the U.S. tax effect. Under a classical corporate income tax 
system:  the total source-country tax liability on subsidiary i equals, 
(4)  = T,Y + w,D,. 
As a result, the only host-country tax consequences of a dividend remittance 
are the associated withholding taxes. If the parent is in excess credit, there is 
no U.S. tax consequence and therefore the global tax price is 0,. If the parent 
is in excess limitation, the global tax price, p, is 
p = (T -  Ti)/(l -  Ti). 
8. Congress has restricted cross-crediting by creating “baskets” of different types of  foreign 
income to each of which a separate foreign tax credit limitation applies. Before the 1986 act, the 
period which our study covers, there were five separate baskets: (1) one for investment interest 
income, (2) one for “domestic international sales corporation” dividend income, (3) one for the 
foreign trade income of a “foreign sales corporation,” (4) another for distributions from a foreign 
sales corporation, and (5) one for all other foreign-source income, which we will call general 
limitation income. The 1986 act decreased the potential for cross-crediting further by  increasing 
the number of separate limitation baskets to nine. 
9. For simplicity we focus our discussion in this section on the derivation of the tax price of a 
dividend remittance from a foreign subsidiary operating in a country that uses a classical corporate 
tax system. In our empirical work we also take details of host-country tax systems into account, 
since our sample includes  subsidiaries that operate in countries with split-rate and imputation 
systems. The derivation of the tax prices for these types of tax systems is discussed in detail in 
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The withholding tax has no net effect on global taxes because the extra with- 
holding tax paid on the dividend remittance is offset by a reduction of U.S. tax 
of an equal amount. Due to cross-crediting, the global tax price may be nega- 
tive and dividend payments may reduce the firm’s global tax liability.’O 
Expression (5)  shows that, if the parent corporation is in excess limitation, 
the tax price of  a dividend remittance is inversely related to the subsidiary’s 
average tax rate, 7,.  As  noted previously, to the extent that these variations in 7, 
are endogenous, for example, because the timing of deductions and credits is 
elective, they can become a part of  tax-planning strategies for repatriating 
foreign-source income. Even if a subsidiary’s average tax rate is relatively con- 
stant, the tax price of remittances will fluctuate significantly when the subsid- 
iary’s parent switches credit position. Consider a subsidiary with an  average 
tax rate above the U.S. corporate rate. When the parent is in excess limitation, 
the tax price of a dividend remittance is negative ((7 -  T,)/( 1 -  7,) <  0). When 
the parent is in excess credit, the tax price equals the withholding tax rate. As 
a result, tax prices for some subsidiaries can be negative in some years and 
positive in others. These changes in tax prices may also be endogenous if par- 
ents can control their foreign tax credit positions through careful structuring of 
remittances from foreign subsidiaries. The next section presents an estimation 
strategy to separate the effect of these transitory components of tax prices from 
the effect of changes in the permanent component. 
9.3  Empirical Model of Dividend Repatriations 
Previous work by  Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Altshuler and Newlon 
(1993) has estimated a simple empirical model of dividend repatriations. For 
subsidiaries paying a dividend, the model takes the following basic form: 
(6)  d = a, + a,P + br + XA + E, 
where d is the dividend payout expressed as the ratio of  subsidiary dividends 
to assets, P is the current tax price of dividend repatriation,” r is the after-tax 
rate of return for the subsidiary, and X  is a vector of characteristics of  subsid- 
iary and parent. Equation (6)  is not derived explicitly from the firm’s optimiza- 
tion problem, but can be considered a reduced form suitable for testing the 
general implications of  theoretical models such as Hartman’s.  It is similar to 
10. We neglect here the cases in which the parent corporation has tax losses, since, as in earlier 
papers by Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Altshuler and Newlon (1993). we include in our sample 
only those U.S.  corporations with positive worldwide taxable income. Corporations with tax losses 
are excluded here for simplicity’s sake, since the carryover rules for tax  losses and foreign tax 
credits can interact in ways that may complicate the incentives for income repatriation of  these 
firms. 
11. Altshuler and Newlon (1993) also use a measure of the “expected” tax price that attempts 
to take into account the fact that excess foreign tax credits can be carried back to several prior 
years or forward to several future years to offset taxes in those years. 261  Do Repatriation Taxes Matter? 
the empirical models used to explain dividend payments in a purely domestic 
context. 
In these previous papers, P was expected to have a negative coefficient since 
higher tax prices were expected to reduce the attractiveness of  repatriation. 
The after-tax rate of return, K may have an ambiguous effect on the dividend 
payout. On the one hand, if dividend payments are a residual, then higher eam- 
ings, which would increase the measured rate of return, could be expected 
ceteris paribus to increase the dividend payout. On the other hand, a higher 
after-tax rate of return would increase desired investment, having the effect of 
increasing retained earnings and reducing the dividend payout. Other relevant 
variables are included in X, the most important of which is perhaps the age of 
the subsidiary. Some of  the theoretical literature (such as Newlon  1987 and 
Sinn 1990)  suggests that older subsidiaries should have higher dividend payout 
ratios. This prediction is a direct consequence of the value of deferral when 
there is a repatriation tax; that is, if there is deferral, then dividend payouts will 
on average be an increasing function of age, other things constant. 
As noted already, by  using the current tax price, fl the above model may 
confound the potentially different effects of permanent and transitory compo- 
nents of the tax price. It is beyond the scope of this paper to derive a theoretical 
model that explicitly incorporates intertemporal  variation in repatriation tax 
prices. Instead, we use a reduced-form empirical model to test the general im- 
plications that could be expected from any such model. In particular, a transi- 
tory decrease (increase) in the tax price reduces the current tax price relative 
to future tax prices and thus enables the firm to increase the value of its foreign- 
source income by accelerating (delaying) dividend repatriations. But a perma- 
nent change in the tax price does not change the relative prices of current and 
future repatriation. Therefore, one would expect dividend repatriations to be 
affected more by transitory than by permanent changes in tax prices. And Hart- 
man's (1985) work would indicate that permanent changes in tax prices should 
have no effect at all on dividend repatriations. 
Based on these considerations, our empirical model generalizes equation (6) 
to allow for differences in transitory and permanent tax price effects: 
(7)  d = a, + a,(P -  P*) + a,P* + br + XA + E, 
where P*  is the permanent component of the tax price and hence P -  P*  is 
the transitory component. We estimate this in a slightly different form: 
(8)  d = a, + a,P + (a, -  a,)P* + br + XA  + E. 
One difficulty in estimating equation (8) is that the permanent component 
of  the tax price, P*, is unobservable. To capture the effect of  P*  we use an 
instrumental variables approach in which we instrument the tax price on a vari- 
able, P', that we expect to be correlated  with the permanent component of 
the tax price but uncorrelated with its transitory component. This essentially 
involves replacing P* in equation (8) with its predicted value, 262  Rosanne Altshuler, T. Scott Newlon, and William C. Randolph 
B*  = bo + 6,P  + b,r  + xB, 
where the coefficients are derived from the regression 
P* = b, + b,P + b,r  + XB + 5. 
We experiment with two alternative instruments for the permanent component 
of the tax price, the country average tax price and the country statutory with- 
holding tax rate. These instruments reflect cross-country variation in taxes that 
should also be reflected in the permanent component of  the tax price but not 
in the purely transitory component. 
For estimation of equation (8), we use a Tobit procedure because dividend 
payments are censored at zero. On the surface, this may appear unnecessary 
since actual dividend payments are, by  definition, nonnegative. However, the 
desired level of dividend payments could be negative. This result would obtain 
if, as suggested by the theoretical work in this area, foreign retained earnings 
were the preferred source of finance for foreign investment but foreign invest- 
ment exceeded foreign earnings. Our use of  a Tobit procedure implicitly as- 
sumes that we have modeled desired dividends, but only observe actual divi- 
dends. 
9.4  Data 
Our data set contains information from three sets of  tax and information 
forms filed by a large sample of nonfinancial U.S. multinational corporations. 
Subsidiary data are obtained from information returns, called 5471 forms, filed 
for each foreign subsidiary of  a U.S. taxpayer. Form 5471 includes balance 
sheet and income statement variables along with detailed information on remit- 
tances to U.S. parent corporations. For the purposes of this study, we needed 
to append information on the taxable income and foreign tax credit position of 
parent corporations to the subsidiary specific data from the form 547  I 's. We 
obtained income data from corporate income tax returns filed by the U.S. par- 
ent corporations. We  calculated foreign tax credit positions using data from 
the forms filed in support of foreign tax credit claims. Detailed data from for- 
eign tax credit forms and data from 547  1 forms is compiled only in even years 
and were available to us for only the years 1980, 1982, 1984, and 1986. 
Calculating subsidiary-specific tax prices for dividend remittances for each 
sample year also requires knowledge of the host-country withholding tax rates, 
the appropriate foreign corporate tax rates, and details of host-country tax sys- 
tems. To develop a list of country-specific withholding tax rates for each sam- 
ple year, we used the Price Waterhouse (1980, 1982, 1984, 1986) guides and 
tax treaties. These guides also provided the appropriate statutory tax rates for 
the countries in our sample with nonclassical (e.g., split-rate and imputation) 
corporate tax systems. Finally, in each year of the sample we used the subsid- 263  Do Repatriation Taxes Matter? 
iary's  average foreign tax rate to measure the corporate tax rate  T,  at which 
dividends are grossed up and foreign tax credits are calculated. To  calculate 
this rate we divided foreign tax payments by before-tax earnings and profits, 
both obtained from the 547 1 form data. 
In  some situations, calculating average tax rates in this manner may  lead 
to an unsatisfactory approximation of  7,.  In particular, problems arise when 
subsidiaries report negative earnings and profits, receive tax refunds from host 
countries, repatriate dividends in excess of  current earnings and profits, and 
receive dividends from subsidiaries of their own. Where feasible, adjustments 
were made in these cases to arrive at a more satisfactory measure of  T~.'*  Vari- 
ous screens were also applied to the data to eliminate observations for which 
the data were suspect. After these deductions the total number of observations 
in the sample was 22,906. 
Some of  the estimation required linking subsidiaries in two consecutive 
sample years to form a panel. This was done largely through an algorithm that 
matched subsidiaries based on their U.S. parent corporation, company name, 
date of incorporation, and country of residence. Many subsidiaries could not 
be matched on this basis, and they therefore could not be included in the panel. 
The total number of observations in the panel was 7,118. 
Table  9.1 presents for each country represented in the sample the mean 
dividend-asset ratio, the mean tax price, the standard deviation of the tax price, 
and the statutory withholding tax rate for the subsidiaries located in that coun- 
try for 1984. This table provides information that may be valuable in evaluating 
the usefulness of country mean tax prices and statutory withholding tax rates 
as instruments for the permanent component of the tax price. First, note that 
there is substantial variation in country mean tax prices and in statutory with- 
holding tax rates. Mean country tax prices range from -0.21  for Germany to 
0.38 for Greece. Statutory withholding tax rates range from zero for a number 
of tax haven countries to 55 percent for Mexico. This degree of variation across 
countries means that these variables may be useful instruments, since the cross- 
country variation is presumably correlated with variation in the permanent 
component of the tax price. 
Note also that within each country the standard deviation of the tax price is 
relatively large, in no case less than 0.14. This demonstrates that there is a 
substantial portion of  variation in tax prices not explained by  differences in 
country statutory dividend withholding and corporate income tax rates. Finally, 
note that no clear relationship between country mean dividend payout ratios 
and country mean tax prices or statutory withholding rates emerges from in- 
spection of table 9.1. This presages the results presented in the next section. 
12. See Altshuler and Newlon (1993) for a description of the methodology. 264  Rosanne Altshuler, T.  Scott Newlon, and William C. Randolph 
Table 9.1  Country Averages, 1984 
Tax Price 
Mean Dividend-  Withholding 
Asset Ratio  Standard  Tax Rate 
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9.5  Results 
Table 9.2 presents the estimation results. Column (1) of  the table presents 
the results of estimating the simple dividend model presented in equation (6) 
that incorporates only the current tax price of repatriation. These estimates use 
the full sample of  22,906 observations. They are presented to check that the 
results with our sample are essentially the same as found by  Hines and Hub- 
bard (1990) and Altshuler and Newlon (1993). 
The results presented in column (1  ) are indeed similar to those found in 
previous work. The coefficient on the tax price is negative and statistically 
significant and of  similar magnitude to the estimates in previous papers. To 
gauge the economic significance of this coefficient, note that it implies that a 
reduction in tax price of one standard deviation (0.34) implies an increase in 
the overall dividend payout ratio (including those that pay dividends and those 
that do not) of about 0.004, which is equal to about  11 percent of  the mean 
dividend payout ratio of 0.036. Thus, moving the tax price from one standard 
deviation above the mean to one standard deviation below the mean implies an 
increase in the dividend payout ratio equal to about 22 percent of  the mean 
dividend payout ratio. 
The coefficient on the after-tax rate of return is positive, significant, and less 
than one. This is plausible, since it implies that an increase in earnings in- 
creases dividend payments. Because it is significantly less than one, the coef- 
ficient also suggests that an increase in the after-tax rate of return increases 
retained earnings. Also as expected, the coefficient on subsidiary age is posi- 
tive and significant. 
Column (2) and the remaining columns of  the table present the results of 
estimating the model in equation (8) that distinguishes between permanent and 
transitory tax price effects. To  interpret the tax price coefficient estimates in 
these columns, recall that in equation (8) the effect of the transitory component 
of the tax price is captured by  the coefficient on the current tax price, while 
the coefficient on the permanent tax price equals the difference between the 
permanent and transitory tax price effects. Thus, the coefficient estimates in 
the first row of the table represent transitory tax price effects, the second-row 
coefficient estimates represent the difference between the permanent and tran- 
sitory tax price effects, and the coefficient estimates in the third row, which are 
sums of the coefficients in the first two rows, represent permanent tax price ef- 
fects. 
Column (2) of table 9.2 shows estimates, using the full sample, of the basic 
model in which the country mean tax price is used as an instrument for the 
permanent component of  the tax price. The estimated effect of the transitory 
component of the tax price (in the first row) is negative and statistically sig- 
nificant. Furthermore, it is larger in absolute magnitude than the estimated ef- 
fect from the model excluding the permanent tax  price effect.13  This result 
13. A Hausman test shows that this difference is statistically significant. Table 9.2  Tobit Model Estimation Results 
Full Sample  Full Sample  Partial Sample Matched with 'Iivo-Year Leads 
RHS Variables and Estimation Details  (1) 
Current (global) tax price 





































(4)  (5  )  (6) 
-0.078  -0.070  -0.047 
(.0114)  (.020)  (.0057) 
0.089  0.080  0.080 
(.0265)  (.031)  (.076) 
0.010  0.010  0.033 
(.024)  (.024)  (.076) 
0.80  0.80  0.55 
(.055)  (.055)  (.032) 
0.33  0.33  0.38 
(.028)  (.028)  (.022) 




























































































Note:  Dependent variable is ratio of subsidiary dividends to assets. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
"Measures the difference between effects of changes in permanent and transitory tax prices (transitory tax price = current tax price -  permanent tax price). 
bMeasures the effect of permanent tax price changes, holding the transitory tax price constant. 
Wses part of withholding rate orthogonal to the foreign statutory and country mean average tax rates. 268  Rosanne Altshuler, T.  Scott Newlon, and William C. Randolph 
implies that transitory variation in the tax price has a large effect on the incen- 
tive to repatriate income. 
The estimated  difference between  the permanent  and transitory tax price 
effects presented in the second row of column (2) is positive and statistically 
significant. This implies that the permanent component of the tax price is not 
only significantly different from the transitory tax price effect, but, since the 
coefficient is positive, cannot have as large a negative impact on dividend repa- 
triations. In fact, the estimated permanent tax price effect presented in the third 
row is not significantly different from zero. These results provide support for 
the hypothesis that the dividend repatriation incentive is affected by transitory 
but not permanent changes in the tax price of repatriation, a result that is con- 
sistent with Hartman’s analysis. 
One potential problem with the results from the basic model in column (2) 
arises because the tax incentive to retain earnings abroad should depend on the 
expected  foreign after-tax rate of  return, but we use the actual rate for the 
current year in our estimates. This may bias the coefficient on the after-tax rate 
of return toward zero. More important, the difference between the current and 
expected after-tax rates of return will be part of the error term. Consequently, 
the current tax price and the country mean tax price will both be correlated 
with the error term because both depend on current foreign taxes and income. 
This may bias the coefficients on the current and permanent tax prices. 
To explore whether this is a significant problem, we used the two-year-lead 
after-tax rate of return as an instrument for the expected after-tax rate of return. 
The motivation for this approach is that, under rational expectations, the differ- 
ence between the future actual and expected after-tax rates of return (the fore- 
cast error) should be independent of the current after-tax rate of return, which 
reflects only current information. 
This approach reduces the sample size in two ways. First, use of  the two- 
year lead means that only the first three years of the data can be used. Second, 
only observations for which matches could be found in the following year of 
the sample could be used. As mentioned above, these restrictions reduced the 
sample size to 7,118. 
There is some risk that the selection of subsidiaries dropped from the sample 
by these requirements was not random. For example, current income repatria- 
tion might depend on whether there are plans to sell a subsidiary in the future, 
and  subsidiaries sold within two years would be excluded from the sample. 
Subsidiaries that are being shut down might also be more or less likely to pay 
dividends, and a subsidiary  shut down within two years would be excluded 
from the sample. If for these or other reasons the selection was significantly 
nonrandom, selection bias might be induced. 
To investigate whether there is any potential selection bias, column (3) of 
table 9.2 presents the results of estimating the basic model of column (2) using 
the restricted sample. Note that a higher percentage of the subsidiaries in the 
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tent, for example, with dividend payments being lower before a subsidiary is 
sold or shut down. But note that based on Hausman tests on the individual 
coefficients of  interest the regression results do not differ significantly from 
those obtained using the full sample. Thus, there are no signs of selection bias 
in the restricted sample. 
Column (4) of table 9.2 presents the results of the regression using the two- 
year-lead after-tax rate of  return as an instrument for the expected after-tax 
rate of return. The coefficient on the after-tax rate of return increases, and the 
difference is significant based on a Hausman test. This coefficient implies that 
a higher expected after-tax rate of return is associated with greater retention of 
earnings, but not by as much as measured in the previous regressions. The tax 
price coefficients are not  significantly different from those in column (2).14 
These results therefore provide no evidence that the permanent tax price coef- 
ficients are biased by using the current instead of the expected future foreign 
after-tax rate of return. 
A second potential problem arises because even after controlling for differ- 
ences in country average tax prices and the other regression variables using the 
instrumental variables approach, the current tax price may still be correlated 
with the permanent tax price. This is because the permanent tax price may 
depend not only on cross-country differences in taxes, but also on the portfolio 
of subsidiaries held by the U.S. parent corporation, on the parent’s U.S. opera- 
tions, and on expectations about the future. This problem also could bias the 
tax price coefficients. It would tend to bias the transitory tax price coefficient 
toward the permanent tax price coefficient and to bias the permanent tax price 
coefficient (i.e., the estimated difference between the permanent and transitory 
tax price effects) toward zero. 
To  determine whether this is a serious problem, we  estimated the model 
using the change in tax price between the current year and the two-year lead 
as an instrument for the transitory tax price. This approach was adopted be- 
cause the change in the tax price is likely to be less correlated than the current 
tax price with the permanent tax price. The results of this estimation are pre- 
sented in column (5) of table 9.2. There is no significant change in any of the 
coefficients; they are simply estimated with somewhat less precision. Thus, 
there is no evidence that the tax price coefficients are biased from a correlation 
between the current and permanent tax prices. 
A third problem may  exist because much of  the variation in the country 
mean tax price comes from variations in effective corporate tax rates across 
countries, but variations in foreign effective corporate tax rates may also affect 
foreign after-tax rates of  return. As a result, it may be difficult to separately 
identify the effects of  variations in foreign effective tax rates as they affect 
14. The coefficient on the current tax price is just barely significantly different (T = 2.0), but 
the significance is probably overstated since we have not adjusted the standard errors to account 
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repatriation through their effect on the tax price of  repatriation and as they 
affect repatriation through their effects on the foreign after-tax rate of return. 
For example, a higher foreign corporate tax rate will decrease the tax price of 
repatriation for the subsidiary of a U.S. corporation that is in excess limitation, 
but it will also, ceteris paribus, decrease the foreign after-tax rate of return, 
thereby decreasing the incentive to defer repatriation of  foreign income. Al- 
though the models we  estimate attempt to avoid this problem by  controlling 
separately for the foreign after-tax rate of return, the measure we use is imper- 
fect, and hence there is some possibility of misspecification biasing the tax 
price results. 
Our first approach to testing whether this is a significant problem is to use 
the country statutory dividend withholding tax rate in place of  the country 
mean tax price as an instrument for the permanent component of the tax price. 
The statutory withholding tax rate is related to the tax price, but has no direct 
relation to the corporate tax rate. Column (6) of table 9.2 presents the results 
of this estimation, using the full sample again. Note that the permanent tax 
price coefficient changes very little from the basic model estimate in column 
(2).  The difference is not statistically significant based on a Hausman test. This 
provides some evidence that there is no serious misspecification problem. 
The approach used to generate the results presented in column (6) may not 
provide a conclusive fix for the potential problem, because country statutory 
withholding tax rates are correlated with country corporate tax rates. To ad- 
dress this additional possible difficulty we  remove the correlation from the 
withholding rate instrument. To do this we regress the withholding rate on the 
country mean average corporate tax rate and the country statutory tax rate and 
use the residual from this regression as an instrument for the permanent com- 
ponent of the tax price. In other words, we use as an instrument the part of the 
withholding tax rate that is orthogonal to the country mean tax rate and the 
statutory corporate tax rate. The results of this procedure are presented in col- 
umn (7) of table 9.2. Here again the coefficient on the permanent component 
of the tax price is not significantly different, based on a Hausman test, from 
the coefficient obtained in the estimates of the basic model presented in col- 
umn (2). 
9.6  Conclusion 
The tax price effects on dividend repatriations found in previous studies 
using the simple model of  dividend repatriations apparently measure largely 
the effect of the timing of dividend repatriations undertaken to take advantage 
of intertemporal variation in tax prices. These timing opportunities may arise 
either endogenously, through tax planning that affects both tax prices and divi- 
dend payments, or through exogenously caused variations in tax prices. There- 
fore, although repatriation taxes seem to affect dividend repatriation behavior, 271  Do Repatriation Taxes Matter? 
this is apparently only because tax prices vary over time. This result is consis- 
tent with the prediction of Hartman’s model. 
The results presented here should not be construed to imply that the “perma- 
nent” levels of host- and home-country taxation do  not affect dividend repatria- 
tion by  foreign subsidiaries. Host- and home-country  corporate taxation will 
of course affect the earnings reinvestment  decision,  and hence the dividend 
repatriation decision, through their impacts on host- and home-country  after- 
tax rates of return. The evidence from our estimates merely implies that host- 
and home-country  taxation do not affect repatriation  through the permanent 
component of the repatriation tax. 
Our results may have policy implications. The most obvious implications 
relate to policies on dividend withholding tax rates. For example, many capital- 
importing countries consider lowering withholding taxes, either unilaterally or 
in the context of bilateral tax treaty negotiations, to try to attract new equity 
investment. But some countries may be inhibited by the fear that such a mea- 
sure would lead to increased  flight of the accumulated multinational  equity 
“trapped” by existing high withholding taxes. Our results suggest that, as long 
as the reduction in the withholding tax rate is viewed as permanent, such fears 
are unfounded.  Permanent changes in dividend withholding tax rates appear 
likely mainly to attract new equity investment and not to encourage repatria- 
tion of equity accumulated from past earnings.’* 
To the extent that these results support the Hartman model, they have impli- 
cations regarding the incentive effects of the credit and deferral  system that 
the United States uses to tax most foreign income of U.S. multinationals.  In 
particular, if the repatriation tax is irrelevant for the dividend repatriation deci- 
sion, then, at least as regards retained earnings, the incentives for foreign in- 
vestment are the same as they would be under a system that exempts foreign 
income from taxation. 
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COInIneIlt  William M. Gentry 
Recent empirical evidence (Hines and Hubbard  1990; Altshuler and Newlon 
1993) on how taxes affect dividend repatriation decisions of U.S.  multinational 
corporations with foreign subsidiaries appears at odds with economic theory. 
These papers  find that the tax  consequences of  repatriating  dividends  affect 
the level of repatriations: firms for which dividends generate little in the way 
of  extra current taxes repatriate more dividends than firms for which dividends 
would generate more in extra current taxes. While this result seems plausible 
at face value, it is contrary to the “trapped equity” view of dividend taxation. 
This theory (see Hartman 1985) suggests that taxes should not affect dividend 
repatriation decisions provided that a firm faces the same tax rate over time. 
Unlike previous empirical work, Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph address 
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the issue of whether firms face the same tax rate over time. The authors offer 
two important innovations over previous empirical work: (1) they incorporate 
instrumental variable techniques that separate temporary and permanent tax 
rates, and (2) they have panel data. By separating the tax rate facing a firm into 
a temporary and a permanent component, the authors can measure tax effects 
that are much more in the spirit of Hartman’s theory. Their results are striking 
and consistent across specifications: temporary tax rates affect repatriations, 
but permanent tax rates do not have statistically significant effects on repatria- 
tions. Thus, the results are consistent with both Hartman’s theory and previous 
empirical work. Current tax rates affect repatriation decisions, but the perma- 
nent component of the tax rate (the object of the Hartman’s theory) does not 
affect repatriations. 
My  first comments address questions  about alternative estimation tech- 
niques for separating permanent and temporary tax rates. My later comments 
address ideas for further study of the interaction between taxes and dividend 
repatriation. 
Separating Permanent and Temporary Components of the Tax Price 
The paper’s empirical model regresses dividend repatriations (normalized 
by  subsidiary assets) on the current tax price, the permanent tax price, the 
subsidiary’s rate of return, the subsidiary’s age, and a set of  year effects. The 
immediate problem for estimating this equation is that the permanent tax price 
is unobservable. The paper solves this problem by using the predicted value of 
the current tax rate as the permanent tax rate. This predicted value of the tax 
rate comes from regressing the current tax price on the other regressors in the 
main equation plus an  instrument. The instrument is typically the mean tax 
price of other U.S. subsidiaries operating in the same country. 
The goal is to separate the current tax price, P, into two components, P* the 
permanent tax price and E the temporary component of the tax price. The paper 
uses the country mean tax price or the statutory withholding tax rate as the key 
piece of  information for distinguishing the two components. My  concern is 
whether these instruments are adequate for separating the two components. 
As a somewhat silly example of  my  concern, consider a country that hosts 
subsidiaries from two industries, A and B. Subsidiaries in the two industries 
face different permanent tax prices, Pi and Pi, and neither industry has a tem- 
porary component in its tax price. That is, subsidiaries in each industry face a 
constant tax price over time. Suppose that industry A has a higher tax price 
than industry B. If  there are an equal number of  subsidiaries from the two 
industries, then the country mean tax price would be (Pi + P;)/2. In the frame- 
work of the paper, each subsidiary would be measured as having a current tax 
price that  differs from the permanent tax price. Subsidiaries in industry A 
would be measured as having above average tax prices, and those in industry 
B would be measured as having below average tax prices. If firms in industry 
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the paper would classify this situation as firms responding to temporary fluc- 
tuations in the tax price instead of properly classifying it as a response to dif- 
ferences in permanent tax prices. 
While this particular example is contrived, the general point is that perma- 
nent tax rates may vary across firms within a country. I can suggest two types 
of sensitivity analysis for the potential problem of  misclassifying the compo- 
nents of the current tax price. The first change would be to expand the informa- 
tion set used to predict the permanent component of the tax price. The addi- 
tional  variables  should be  correlated with  the permanent tax price but  not 
correlated with the temporary  component of  the tax price. These would be 
things that would be correlated with the permanent situation of the firm but not 
temporary conditions for the firm. Thus, the subsidiary’s industry, its parent, or 
its mix of assets (equipment vs. structures) might be plausible candidates, but 
the rate of growth of  assets would not be appropriate since it depends on the 
temporary condition of the firm. 
The second change in the measurement of permanent tax prices would make 
more explicit use of the panel nature of the data. For firms that appear in the 
data for all of the years, the permanent tax price could be defined as the average 
tax rate over the four years and the temporary component would be the devia- 
tion from this average. This methodology would be similar to Auten and Clot- 
felter’s (1 982) work on capital gains realizations. The advantage of this method 
is that it allows for firm-specific permanent tax rates. Obviously, this method 
is not without its own flaws. For a firm that truly had a temporarily low tax 
price in all four of the years, this method would misclassify this temporarily 
low tax price as a permanent tax price. Also, the sample size might be reduced 
considerably by  the need to match firms across years. If  this attrition is not 
random, the smaller sample might suffer from selection bias. For example, the 
matched  sample used  in specifications  (3)-(5)  in table 9.2 is slightly more 
likely to pay dividends than the full sample. While the methodology  in the 
paper may in the end be more attractive than using a smaller matched sample, 
this alternative would provide an interesting check for robustness. 
Variance of the Distribution of Tax Prices 
Table 9.1 shows that the variance in  the distribution  of  current tax prices 
differs substantially across countries. These differences are not incorporated 
in the estimation but may be important for the size of a firm’s response to the 
temporary component in its tax price. For example, in 1984, both Mexico and 
Chile had a mean tax price of 0.25. However, the standard deviation of the tax 
price is 0.43 in Mexico and 0.20 in Chile. If firms believed that the distribution 
of tax prices would be the same in the future and that their current tax price is 
a random draw from the country’s distribution of tax prices, then a current tax 
price of 0.10 should have less of  an effect on firms in Mexico than in Chile. 
The intuition for this difference comes from search theory. For parent firms of 
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price is a relatively small deviation in the tax price. They would be less willing 
to pay dividends based on the -0.15  deviation from the mean tax price because 
they know the probability  of  an even lower tax price next year  is relatively 
high. That is, parents with Mexican subsidiaries should be more likely to turn 
down the opportunity to repatriate at a tax price of 0.10 and wait (the equiva- 
lent of effortless search) for a lower tax rate in the future.’ 
In terms of estimation, I expect that correcting for the differences in the 
variance of tax prices would involve weighting the observations based on the 
variance of the conditional  distribution  of tax prices of  the firm. That is, an 
observation with a 0.15 deviation in the tax price should receive more weight 
in the estimation if it is from a country with a tight distribution of tax prices 
than if it is from a country with a disperse distribution of tax prices. 
Endogenous versus Exogenous Variation in Tax Prices 
I find the variation in tax prices both within and across countries intriguing. 
AS  discussed in Altshuler and Newlon (1993),  part of this variation comes from 
firms moving between  excess credit and excess limitation status. Part of the 
variation comes from fluctuations in the subsidiary’s average tax rate created 
by fluctuations in business conditions. Some of the variation within a country 
comes from differential  taxation  of  industries  and assets. Last, some of the 
variation across time and across countries results from legislated differences 
in tax rules. Many of these sources of variation, such as legislated differences 
in tax codes, are exogenous (at least in the short run) to both the parent firm 
and the subsidiary. However, other parts of the variation in tax prices depend 
on the firm’s decisions. For  example, cross-crediting  provisions mean that a 
parent’s decisions for one subsidiary affect the incentives to repatriate income 
from another subsidiary. The paper does the obvious thing and assumes that 
tax price fluctuations are exogenous to the firm. At some level, the tax prices 
and repatriations are endogenously determined by other firm choices. This en- 
dogeneity, however, does not lend itself to regression analysis and may be best 
left for case-study methods on multinational tax planning (see Wilson 1993). 
Extensions to Other Questions in International Taxation 
The distinction of temporary and permanent components in the tax price is 
potentially important for a number of other decisions faced by multinational 
corporations.  For example, the choice between structuring a subsidiary  such 
that it will pay dividends instead of rents and royalties may depend on both the 
level and volatility of tax prices for the different repatriation channels.  Another 
example would be the parent’s choice between lending money to the subsidiary 
and making an equity transfusion. One would expect that these more long-run 
organizational  form choices would be more sensitive to permanent tax rates 
I.  This analogy to search assumes that the firms passively accept the current year’s tax price. As 
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than to current tax rates that include a temporary component. However, the 
timing of these transactions (such as royalty payments) may be sensitive to the 
temporary component of tax rates. The challenge for empirical work is to sort 
through how  permanent and temporary components of  taxes affect both the 
level of activity and the timing of activity. I hope that the authors will use their 
impressive data set to explore some of these issues in future papers. 
Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, I found this paper very interesting and insightful. The authors 
are to be commended for cleverly disentangling the tax incentives for dividend 
repatriations. In addition to reconciling the apparent differences between eco- 
nomic theory and previous empirical work on how taxes affect multinational 
dividend repatriation decisions, the paper serves as a reminder that timing is- 
sues can be extremely important for how taxes affect business decisions. 
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